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Judgment : High Court Division
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Case Number Parties Short Description
41 The State Vs. Executive Magistrate Mohammad Rafiqul Islam also the Upazilla Nirbahi Officer of Sakhipur, Tangail and another
42 Md. Abul Kalam and others VS Md. Entaj Ali Sheikh and others Because of any fancy evasive objection or statement of the preemptee, it is not at all obligatory for the Trial Court to hold any inquiry to assess the actual consideration money of the case land under section 96(3)(b) of the State Acquisition and Tenancy Act. On the plea of a minor mistake or error of calculation caused due to latches of any particular lawyer, no Court shall deprive a party to the pre-emption case from exercising his statutory right, to which he is otherwise entitled to.
43 Badiul Alam Majumdar and others Vs. Information Commission, Bangladesh
44 Hazi Safiuddin Ahmed Vs. The Administrator of Waqfs Bangladesh and others Sections 32(4), 34, 43, 44 , 51 of the Waqfs Ordinance, 1962 Power of the Administrator in respect of appointment of Mutawalli : The Waqfs Ordinance does not empower the Administrator of Waqfs to appoint mutawalli of a waqf estate in a casual manner or as a routine work. Save under exceptional situations/circumstances detailed in the various provisions of the Waqfs Ordinance as discussed above the Administrator has no authority or jurisdiction to appoint mutawalli of any waqf estate. In a normal situation i.e where the terms of the waqf deed in respect of appointment of mutawalli is clear and unambiguous and not inconsistent with Mahomedan Law or there is no dispute to be settled by the Court the prospective mutawalli would assume the office of mutawalli in terms of waqf deed and in that case the provisions of section 51 would follow.
45 Criminal Appeal 7225/2013 Durnity Daman Commission Vs. Md. Tarique Rahman (absconding) and the State with Criminal Appeal No.7469 of 2013 Md. Gias Uddin Al- Mamun Vs. The State and another
46 Afangir @ Kalu Vs. The State Explosive Substance Act, 1908 Section 4/6: Mere knowledge of an accused or his equivocal disclosure about existence of bomb-making powders during his police custody shall not expose him to any criminal liability of possessing or controlling that illegal substance. ... (Para 24)
47 The State Vs. Nurul Islam Sarkar and Others.
48 Md Majharul HoqueMonsur Vs Mir Kashim Chowdhury Section 138 of the N.I. Act:The proceedings initiated on thepetition of complaint under section 138 of the N.I. Act cannot be hindered byor shackled with any proceeding initiated on an arbitration clause. Section 265C of the Code of CriminalProcedure, 1898 andSection 138 of the N.I. Act:Whether the cheque in question wasdrawn against any liability or not is a pure question of fact and withoutawarding ample opportunity to sift those facts, anyone cannot be allowed toobstruct the course of justice depriving the complainant-opposite party, whomay prove his claims and allegations on trial.
49 Md. Golam Faruque Vs Md. SalimReza All particulars relating to the date of receipt or the manner ofservice of the legal notice including other relevant parenthetical informationare bundle of facts and any discourse on those facts or their unerring decisionrequires in-depth scrutiny and threshing of the evidence to be produced intrial. So, mere non-disclosure of those facts in the petition of complaintcannot be a valid cause to make the entire proceedings liable to be quashed,which in true sense will deprive the complainant to prove his case on evidence.
50 Advocate Asaduzzaman Siddiqui and others Vs. Bangladesh represented by the Cabinet Secretary, Cabinet Division, Bangladesh Secretariat
51 Lt. Sheikh Jamal Dhanmondi Club Ltd. Vs. The Secretary, Ministry of Youth and Sports, Government of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh and others
52 Samia Rahman and others Vs. Bangladesh represented by the Secretary, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare and others
53 Birampur Sonali Matshajibi Samabay Samity Ltd. Vs Government of Bangladesh and others Demi-official letter: Its meaning, legal force etc.
Demi-official letter or official correspondence / communication, information, interchange has got no legal force nor have any binding effect or in other words, the recipient of a D.O letter is not legally bound to act in accordance with such letter. Where determination of rights, privilege etc. of person(s) are enshrined in law itself, the same cannot be curtailed or taken away by a mere request/recommendation of the member of Parliament or any other dignitary in the form of D.O letters or any other manner whatsoever.

Amendment of Quotation for Lease: Its Legal Effect
In the case of Niamatpur Matsajibi Samabya Samity vs. Government of Bangladesh and others ( Writ Petition No. 10603 of 2013) the point was raised and we ( to which both of us were parties, judgment delivered on 1.6.2014) observed that “viewed in this light, it is clear that in the bidding process initiated for lease of fisheries there is no scope for amendment / modification, alteration of or varying from the original bid quoted with the initial application or to file fresh application or submit fresh project subsequent to filing of the initial ones”. We see no reason to take departure from the view already taken by us.

Member of Parliament: Are oath bound not to allow their personal interest.
Members of parliament, according to the ‘Clause 5’ of THIRD SCHEDULE of the Constitution, are oath bound not to allow their personal interest to influence the discharge of their duties as members of Parliament. They are not above the law and must act in accordance with law. They are peoples’ representatives, which does not mean that by issuing D.O letters they can favour or dis-favour any particular people or group of people as and when they desire in disregard of law and the interest of the people in general.
54 Abdul Khaleque Vs. The Government of Bangladesh represented by Deputy Commissioner, Narayangonj If no date mentioned in the contract for sale, 6 months shall be deemed to be the period for performance of the contract as per Section 54A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and 1 year limitation as per Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1908 will start after that period. Second part of third column can not override the first part of third column of Article 113.
55 Mst. Anjuara Khanam @ Anju Vs. The State and another (Full Bench Decision): “Power of Tribunal u/s 27, Nari-o-Shishu Nirjatan Daman Ain"
56 Begum Khaleda Zia Vs. The State and another
57 Sadharan Bima Corporation, Sadharan Bima Bhaban, 33, Dilkusha Commercial Area, Dhaka and another. Vs. Messrs Ahad Jute Mills Ltd. and others. (Full Bench Decision): “We have considered the first part of clause (b) of Article 86 of the Limitation Act, which under the heading “Description of Suit” and described the policy of insurance, when the sum insured is payable after proof of the loss has been given to or received by the insurers. Here words “Payable” and “has been given to” are very significant, which means that the sum insured is payable when the proof of loss has been informed to the insurers. In other words it means that the amount of insurance is payable when the loss occurred has been communicated to the insurer with proof or the insurer got the information of the occurrence. All these are thus related to intimation to the insurer about the occurrence, and after such communication, the sum insured became payable. The word “loss” has been mentioned in the first and third part of Article 86(b) of the Limitation Act and the word “loss” referred to as an information of the loss to the insurer resulting from an occurrence and thus making the policy of insurance payable. The word “payable” as mentioned in the first part of the Article, relates to cause of action of the suit i.e. the plaintiff after intimation of proof of loss to the insurer the sum insured has become payable and the plaintiff thus entitle to get the same.”

“From a plain reading of the third part of Article 86(b) of the Limitation Act, which is under the heading “ Time from which period begins to run” provides that is shall run from the date of the occurrence causing the loss accordingly there is no doubt that the suit have to filed within three years from the date of occurrence causing the loss.”
58 The State Vs. Mufti A. Hannan Munshi alias Abul Kalam and others
59 Md. Mosaraf Hossain Vs. Delowara Begum and others It is established that in suit for partition the value of the whole property which determines the jurisdiction of the court and not the value of the plaintiff’s share only
60 Mohammad Ali Akond vs. Jahangirnagar University, Savar, Dhaka and others We have gone through section 51 of the Jahangirnagar University Act, 1973 and found that the Writ Petitioner had equally efficacious and adequate remedy by way of appeal to the Chancellor of the University, where the Syndicate will necessarily be a party. According to section 51 of the Act of 1973, on receipt of appeal the Chancellor will send a copy thereof to the Syndicate seeking its opinion and if he is satisfied with the opinion given by the Syndicate, then may reject the appeal straightaway, in which case the aggrieved party may come with an application under article 102 of the Constitution. There is another option for the Chancellor in which case he will appoint an Inquiry Commission consisting of such persons having no involvement with affairs of the University and on the basis of the report of the Inquiry Commission and the recommendations of the Syndicate, the Chancellor shall decide the appeal. In view of the said provisions of appeal and the decision given by their Lordships in the Appellate Division, as referred to above, we are inclined to hold that at this stage both the Writ Petitions, as filed, under article 102 of the Constitution are not maintainable.
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