Case Number Parties Short Description
1
Jesmn Hosain and others Vs. Ayatun Nessa and others.
The Indian Supreme Court upon considering its earlier decisions of the cases of Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani vs. Indusind Bank Limited 2005 (2) SCC 217; Shambhu Shastri vs. State of Rajasthan, 1989 2 WLN 713(Raj); Ram Prasad v. Hari Narain AIR 1998 (Raj) 185 and Shankar Finance
2
Taj Mohammad and others ...Petitioners. -Versus- Alta Miah and others ....Opposite parties.
3
Md. Selamat Ullah Miji ...Petitioner. -Versus- Most. Solema Begum and others ....Opposite parties
4
Halima Jahan and others. ...Petitioners. -Versus- Md. Salim Bhuiyan being dead his heirs. Most. Kawsar Begum and others ....Opposite parties
5
ShafiqurRahman Chowdhury ...Petitioner. -Versus- Liakat Ali Chowdhury .
6
Shawon Chowdhury alias Shangkor Prasad Sarker and others ...Petitioners. -Versus- Faridul Alam and another.
7
Md. Nazrul Islam and others. ...Petitioners. -Versus- Amorendra Narayan and others. ....Opposite parties.
8
Zayeda Begum . ...Appellant. -Versus- Md. Rafiqul Islam @ Fenu and others ....Respondents.
9
Md. Humayun Kabir and others ...Petitioners. -Versus- Deputy Commissioner, Dhaka and others . ....Opposite parties.
10
Md. Fazle Ali and another Vs. Mosammat Chondona Begum and others
11
Government of the Peoples’ Republic of Bangladesh Vs. Capital Assets Production Ltd. and others
12
Mohammad Mahmudur Rahman Khan ...Petitioner. -Versus- Sonali Bank Limited . ....Opposite party.
13
Tonay Molla and others vs. Uttara Bank Limited and others
14
Md. Hazrot Ali and others . ...Appellants. -Versus- Mst. Khudu Khatun and others . ....Respondents.
15
Sarder Shafiqul Islam Vs. Mahbubur Rahman and others.
As per section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act the right of redemption is available to the mortgagor after the principal loan amount has become due and paid. Section 60A of the Transfer of Property Act allows the mortgagor to require the mortgagee to assign the mortgage debt and transfer mortgagor’s property to such third party as the mortgagor may direct and the mortgagee shall be bound to obey such direction of the mortgagor.

It is settled principle of law that when there is no right, there is no remedy. For the maintainability of a declaratory suit under section 42 of the Specific Relief Act the plaintiff must have a legal character or any right as to the property in suit. A person cannot sue for a declaration of his right unless he has an existing right. In the instant case, the mortgagors neither took permission from HBFC before the transfer was made to the plaintiffs nor repaid the loan amount before the transfer. As such, in view of the relevant provisions of Transfer of Property Act, as discussed above, as well the decision the hon’ble Appellate Division in Syed Jubayer Hossain (supra) the transaction was a fraudulent one and by dint of such transfer plaintiffs could not acquire right, title or interest in the suit property. Accordingly, their suit for declaration that the execution proceeding against their vendor- mortgagors was illegal, in effective and not binding upon them is not maintainable under section 42 of the Specific Relief Act.


The case of Sekandar, 3 LM (AD) 448 (supra) is quite distinguishable considering the facts and circumstances of the instant case because in the said case the third-party-claimants claimed their independent title to and possession in the suit property from the persons other than the mortgagors. In the instant case the plaintiffs are claiming their title to and possession in the suit property through the mortgagors. As such, the plaintiffs cannot be considered as third-party-claimants and accordingly, they have no remedy under rule 103 of Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure for setting aside the auction process because of the fact that the plaintiffs have stepped into the shoes of the mortgagors/ judgment debtors.
16
Rashid Ahmed and others. ...Appellants. -Versus- Messers Three Star Properties Limited and another. ...Respondents.
17
Md. Alamgir Hossain. ...Appellant. -Versus- Md. Mansur Ali and others ....Respondents.
18
Mohiuddin Ahammad Bhuiyan ...Petitioner. -Versus- Badrun Nahar. ....Opposite party.
19
Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology (BUET), represented by its Vice Chancellor, Dhaka. ...Petitioner. -Versus- Amena Begum and others ...Opposite parties.
20
Md. Jalaluddin Sheikh ...Petitioner. -Versus- Md. Abdul Jabbar ....Opposite party.
21
M/S Central Insurance Company Limited. ...Appellant. -Versus- Madina Refineries (Salt) Limited and another. ....Respondents.
22
Sonali Bank Limited. ...Petitioner. -Versus- M/S Asha Textile International and others. ....Opposite parties.
23
Md. Fazle Rabbi alias Babu. ...Petitioner. -Versus- Selina Begum and others. ....Opposite parties.
24
Bir Muktijudda Abdul Hamid and another ...Appellants. -Versus- Secretary, Ministry of Homes, Bangladesh Secretariat, Dhaka, ....Respondents.
25
Md. Nazrul Islam (Dulal) ...Petitioner -Versus- Aklima Akther and others . ....Opposite parties.
26
Md. Sanu Miah being dead his legal heirs 1(Ka) Nurun Nessa Khatun and others. ...Petitioners -VersusRashidpur Tea Easte and others ....Opposite parties
27
Shara Khan vs. Dr. Mandy Karim and another
In other words, section 36 of the Real Estate Development and Management Act, 2010 as a whole provided provisions to resolve specific dispute(s) among the purchaser, developer, or the landowner during implementation of a real estate project through amicable settlement or by constituting joint arbitral tribunal amicably and if they fail to constitute such joint arbitral tribunal, any party to the contract may file case before any appropriate Court constituted under Real Estate Development and Management Act, 2010. In that view of the matter there is no scope to initiate any second arbitration proceeding before the Arbitration Court by any party to the contract under section 36 of the Real Estate Development and Management Act, 2010 read with section 12 of the Arbitration Act, 2001.
28
Abdul Jabbar and another vs. Md. Abdul Aziz Khan and others.
Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act enables the person dispossessed to recover possession without establishing title to the land dispossessed. “Nothing in this section shall bar any person from suing to establish his title” employed in section 9 makes it clear that a person entitled to sue under this section is not bound to do so, but he can always go for a regular suit founded on title, either in addition to or instead of a suit under this section.
29
Khaleda Begum and others Vs. Tanjia Islam Smrity
A service benefit or pension that had not fallen due to a deceased employee in his lifetime or is a kind of grant, donation, bounty, concession and/or compensation by the employer, the amount thereof payable after the death of the employee shall be distributed only to those members of his family who are entitled for the same as per the prevailing rules and regulations of service or under the relevant and applicable provision(s) of law and the law of succession will not applicable.
30
Md. Kashem Sharif @ Abul Kashem Sharif and others Vs. Md. Abul Hossain and others
Sub-rule (3) of rule (2) of Order II of the Code of Civil Procedure gives the plaintiff an opportunity to claim more than one relief after institution of the suit with leave of the Court. Rule (12) of Order xx of the Code empowers the Court to pass a decree of recovery of possession of property with relief of mesne profits or rent. Such claim of rent or mesne profits, if omitted, at the time of institution of the suit, the plaintiff as per sub-rule 2(3) of Order II of the Code may introduce such claim after institution of the suit with the leave of the Court.

In Abdul Karim Meah vs Arch Bishop Christian Missionaries and another 36 DLR (AD) 38 it has been held, “ for realisation of the omitted claim, the plaintiff will be debarred from filing a subsequent suit, but there is no prohibition to the realisation of the omitted claim in the suit by amending the claim.
31
Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, represented by the Deputy Commissioner, Jashore and others. vs Md. Abdul Karim and others
In the above cited cases the Appellate Division stated as to how delay causes by the Government functionaries in preferring a revisions before the higher Courts due to some official formalities as well as dilatory tactics or negligent activities on the part of the Government officials. If the revisional applications brought by the Government are lost for such default, no person would be individually affected but public interest would be affected. Accordingly, the Apex Court took a lenient view in condoning the delay in filing revisional application by the Government.
32
The State Vs. Md. Monir Howlader alias Monir Hossain.
A Confessional statement if not made by accused under inducement, threat or promise, is admissible in evidence. If the confession made by the accused is voluntary and truthful and relates to the accused himself, then no further corroboration is necessary and a conviction of the accused can be solely based on it. Such confessional statement is admissible as a substantive piece of evidence. (Ref: Md. Kamal Hossain and another vs. The State, 19 ADC 455).

By now it is well settled that ordinarily the accused has no obligation to account for the death for which he is placed for trial. If a murder is taken place while the accused has been living with his wife in the same house, then the accused husband, under section 106 of the Evidence Act, is under obligation to explain how his wife had met with her death. In absence of any explanation coming from his side it seems, none other than the accused husband was responsible for causing her death. [Ref: State vs. Aynul Huq, 9 MLR 393; Gauranga Kumar Saha vs. State, 2 BLC (AD) 126; Abdul Mutaleb Howlader vs. State, 5 MLR (AD) 362; Abdus Salam vs. The State, 19 BLD (1999) 98; Abu Sayed (Saked) vs. The State, 12 MLR (AD) 101; Dipok Kumar Sarker vs. State, 40 DLR (AD) 139; Sudhir Kumar Das alias Khudi vs. State, 60 DLR 261; Mamun @ Mamun Ar Rashid vs. State, 74 DLR (AD) 36].
33
Md. Mamun Chowdhury alias Mamun vs. Md. Sohel Rana, Chief Judicial Magistrate, Cumilla
By now it is settled by our Apex Court that in a proceeding under contempt there cannot be both justification and an apology. An apology usually mitigates the offence and if it is unreserved, the Court may accept it. On the other hand, an apology with an attempt to justify the act complained of is no apology at all and if the apology is qualified, hesitating and sought to be used as a device to escape the consequences of the contemner’s action, it must be rejected.

The Judicial Officer’s Protection Act, 1850 only protects a judicial officer from the liabilities of any act done or ordered to be done by him in the discharge of his judicial duties in good faith. The said Act cannot protect him from the offence of contempt of this Court because this Court is empowered to deal with contempt matter by itself under Article 108 of the Constitution and this constitutional power of this Court cannot be obstructed or taken away by any other law of the country.


The contemner, it appears from record, committed serious contempt of this Court by his several acts and orders, as referred to above. He ought to have thrown himself at the mercy of this Court as soon as he was directed to explain his position before issuance of contempt Rule. He did not feel to do so even in the written statement submitted by him after the issuance of this Rule. He rather justified his conduct and judged himself that he committed a minor offence by violating the order of this Court for which he should not be imposed with major punishment by us. Moreover, by justifying his conduct in the affidavit tendering apology the contemner stated that ‘in spite of proceeding with the case and pursuant to the orders passed by him the accused petitioner was neither suffered nor prejudiced’. In the aforesaid way he has directly questioned the authority and dignity of this Court and interfered with proper and unfettered administration of this Court. This is an example of worst type of contempt of this Court. Thus the apology tendered by the contemner cannot be considered as an act of contrition or repentance but the same is very much qualified, hesitating and sought to be used as a device to escape the consequences of his actions and as such, the prayer of apology is rejected.
34
Md. Rahman vs The State
Mere filing of General Diary (GD) against an accused alleging that he made threat to the informant party and starting of NGR case by the Magistrate on the basis of Non-FIR prosecution report submitted by the police against the accused cannot be taken as proven misuse of the privilege of bail unless such allegation is proved by evidence at trial of the NGR case.

It is to be born in mind that rejection of bail in a non-bailable case at the initial stage and cancellation of bail already granted have to be considered and dealt with on different basis. Very cogent and overwhelming circumstances are necessary for an order directing the cancellation of the bail, already granted.
35
Md. Saiful Islam Roni (Jamal) and others vs.The State and another
On the face of it, section 4 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act does not create any bar to lodge a complaint by a private individual before the Special Judge on the allegation of committing corruption by any person. Though sub-rule (3) of rule 13 of Anti-Corruption Commission Rules, 2007 made an embargo that a complaint cannot be received directly by the Special Judge but such provision can not override the provision under section 4 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1958 against the settled principle of law that in case of any conflict between the Act and Rules, the provisions of the Act will prevail.
36
Mrs. Fahmida Mizan and others vs. The State and another
The proviso to sub-section (1) of section 140 of the Act exonerates the second category of a person if he can show that the company has committed the offence without his knowledge or that he could not prevent the commission of the offence despite his endeavour to prevent the same. This will be deductible from the facts and circumstances of the case and it can only be shown and proved by evidence. The liability envisaged in sub-section (1) of section 140 of the Act is on the person who was in-charge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company is fixed by the legislature because he is directly responsible for the offence. This category of persons need not have done any specific overt act or omitted to do anything to be fastened with liability. The very fact that the company has committed the offence is sufficient to make them liable. Accordingly, no averment is required to be made in the petition of complaint specifying their overt act in the commission of the offence by them.
37
Ramjan Dhali vs. The State.
Section 339C(2) of the Cr.P.C stipulates that a Sessions Judge, an Additional Sessions Judge or Assistant Sessions Judge shall conclude the trial of a case within three hundred and sixty days from the date on which the case is received by him for trial. Section 339C(4) of the Code also provides that if a trial cannot be concluded within the said specified time, the accused of a non-bailable offence may be released on bail. Moreover, it is settled principle that an accused cannot be detained in jail for an indefinite period without any trial.
38
Md. Asif Ahammed Vs. The State
The Mobile Court Ain, 2009 does not give any authority to the Executive Magistrate or District Magistrate to proceed against a person in the name of Mobile Court for an offence which is not committed before him while he was conducting Mobile Court for the purpose, as stated above. In other words, there is no scope under the Ain, 2009 to proceed against a person for an offence covered by the Ain, in the name of Mobile Court who was apprehended or arrested or detained by the police from elsewhere and thereafter, was produced before the Executive Magistrate for proceeding against him through Mobile Court.
39
Nurul Kabir Vs. Sodaha Ludhi Shikdarpara Jame Masjid and others
There is no provision in the Waqfs Ordinance, 1962 prohibiting ‘a person interested in the waqf,’ as defined in section 2(8) of the Ordinance, or ‘the waqf estate itself,’ as the case may be, to establish the right, title and interest of the waqf by filing a suit or proceeding in a Court in the event of failure on the part of the Administrator of Waqfs or mutrawalli in taking necessary steps under sections 6A, 56 or 83 of the Ordinance to protect the interest of the waqf.

Accordingly, I am of the view that, being a person interested in the waqf, the Vice-president of the mosque Committee has locus standi to institute the suit representing the waqf estate for protection of its interest.
40
Abul Kasem and another Vs. Mrs. Ummul Hasnat Mahmud Ahmed being dead his heirs Asfaque Ahmed and another
It appears that the whole proceeding in regards execution and registration of the deed in question and endorsement of the Sub-Registrar therein as provided under sections 31, 32, 34, 35, 52, 58, 59 and 60 of the Registration Act, as stated above, were done in accordance with those provisions of the Act and the document achieved strong presumptive evidence as to its due registration. Accordingly, burden was upon the plaintiffs to rebut such evidence by adducing strong evidence to prove that the deed in question was a product of forgery. But the plaintiffs failed to discharge the onus.
41
Moyej Uddin Shah being dead his heirs Most. Hawa Begum Vs. Momtaj Shaha and others
There is no provision under Order XXVI of the Code of Civil Procedure to accept or reject the report submitted by the Commissioner because the law has precisely stated that the report of the Commissioner and the evidence taken by him shall be evidence in the suit and shall form part of the record. The law has given an opportunity to the parties to the suit to examine the Commissioner with the permission of the Court, to challenge the veracity of the report.
42
Md. Ahsan Habib Vs Government of the People`s Republic of Bangladesh
Present: Mr. Justice Md. Nazrul Islam Talukder And Mr. Justice Mohi Uddin Shamim
43
The State vs Oli
44
The State Vs. Lt. Col. (Rtd.) Tarek Sayed and ors
45
The State Vs. Lt. Col. (Rtd.)Tarek Sayed and ors
46
Nazmul Huda and another Vs. The State and another
47
Catherine Masud VS Md. Kashed Miah
48
What is Sexual Harassment? Guidelines of Sexual Harassment
49
Detention in Parent’s Custody
50
DNA Test and Sibling DNA Test